• Title of article

    Convex and exact games with non-transferable utility

  • Author/Authors

    Péter Cs?ka، نويسنده , , P. Jean-Jacques Herings، نويسنده , , L?szl? ?. K?czy، نويسنده , , Mikl?s Pintér، نويسنده ,

  • Issue Information
    روزنامه با شماره پیاپی سال 2011
  • Pages
    6
  • From page
    57
  • To page
    62
  • Abstract
    We generalize exactness to games with non-transferable utility (NTU). A game is exact if for each coalition there is a core allocation on the boundary of its payoff set. Convex games with transferable utility are well-known to be exact. We consider five generalizations of convexity in the NTU setting. We show that each of ordinal, coalition merge, individual merge and marginal convexity can be unified under NTU exactness. We provide an example of a cardinally convex game which is not NTU exact. Finally, we relate the classes of Π-balanced, totally Π-balanced, NTU exact, totally NTU exact, ordinally convex, cardinally convex, coalition merge convex, individual merge convex and marginal convex games to one another.
  • Keywords
    NTU games , Exact games , Convex games
  • Journal title
    European Journal of Operational Research
  • Serial Year
    2011
  • Journal title
    European Journal of Operational Research
  • Record number

    1313062