Institutional arrangements for fisheries: alternate structures and impediments to change

The precarious state of many of the worldʹs important commercial fisheries have called into question the ability of government agencies to carry out mandates related to stock conservation and sustainability. This paper argues that the prominent role of government agencies in building fisheries management systems of the past few decades, has led to the prevalent situation that management is top-down and has fostered the view that these institutions are “in control”. In that view, the fishing sector has generally been excluded from management and is depicted as fundamentally irresponsible with regard to resource sustainability. A paternal government–industry relationship diminishes the opportunity for the fishing industry to become a responsible partner in fisheries management. We argue that institutional arrangements are a major impediment to effective management change. We consider the problem of managing commercial fisheries under current institutional structures by examining the Canadian Department of Fisheries and Oceans as a case study. We outline the benefits of alternative bottom-up and participative decision making for fisheries and discuss the requirements for more effective institutional arrangements that would empower stakeholders toward building a real stakeholders–government partnership.