Title of article
Longer-term consequences of anger expression in negotiation: Retaliation or spillover?
Author/Authors
Van Kleef، نويسنده , , Gerben A. and Dreu، نويسنده , , Carsten K.W. De Dreu، نويسنده ,
Issue Information
ماهنامه با شماره پیاپی سال 2010
Pages
8
From page
753
To page
760
Abstract
Negotiators often concede to angry partners. But what happens when they meet again? According to the spillover hypothesis, negotiators demand less from previously angry partners because they perceive them as tough. According to the retaliation hypothesis, negotiators demand more from previously angry partners because of negative impressions and a desire to get even. Experiment 1 showed that participants demanded less in later negotiations when their partner in a previous negotiation had expressed anger (rather than no emotion) and the later negotiation was with the same (rather than a different) partner. Consistent with the spillover hypothesis, this effect was mediated by inferences regarding the partner’s toughness. Experiment 2 showed that apologies reduce the negative effects of anger on impressions and desire for future interaction. Behavioral reactions were moderated by social value orientation: extending the established might/morality effect, prosocial participants responded cooperatively to an apology, whereas proselfs responded competitively.
Keywords
Anger , Longer-term consequences , Negotiation , Social value orientation , apologies , Cooperation
Journal title
Journal of Experimental Social Psychology
Serial Year
2010
Journal title
Journal of Experimental Social Psychology
Record number
1959492
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