Concrete and abstract ways to deontology: Cognitive capacity moderates construal level effects on moral judgments

Moral judgment research has been informed by both dual-process models and construal level theory. Combining these approaches, we argue that available processing capacity and construal level interact to predict moral judgment. Specifically, concrete construal should enhance visualization for spontaneous judgments, leading to stronger emotional reactions and more deontological decisions. In contrast, abstract construal should direct attention to abstract moral principles for deliberate judgments, again facilitating deontological decisions. In 3 experiments, we manipulated both construal level (abstract vs. concrete) and the availability of processing capacity (Experiment 1: via short vs. long deliberation time; Experiments 2 and 3: via cognitive vs. visual interference) and assessed moral dilemma judgments. Participants made more deontological judgments under concrete (vs. abstract) construal when processing capacity was reduced. With sufficient processing capacity, however, this pattern reversed, leading to more deontological judgments under abstract (vs. concrete) construal. These results extend previous work linking deontological decisions with emotional reactions, by suggesting an alternative pathway to deontology through abstract deliberation.