• Title of article

    Evidence production in adversarial vs. inquisitorial regimes

  • Author/Authors

    Froeb، Luke M. نويسنده , , Kobayashi، Bruce H. نويسنده ,

  • Issue Information
    روزنامه با شماره پیاپی سال 2001
  • Pages
    -266
  • From page
    267
  • To page
    0
  • Abstract
    The advantage of the adversarial regime of judicial decision-making is the superior information of the parties, while the advantage of an idealized inquisitorial regime is its neutrality. We model the tradeoff by characterizing the properties of costly estimators used by each regime. The adversarial regime uses an `extremalʹ estimator that is based on the difference between the most favorable pieces of evidence produced by each party. The inquisitorial regime uses the sample mean. We find that neither regime dominates the other.
  • Keywords
    Unemployment , Threshold models , Population shocks
  • Journal title
    Economics Letters
  • Serial Year
    2001
  • Journal title
    Economics Letters
  • Record number

    21641