Title of article
Evidence production in adversarial vs. inquisitorial regimes
Author/Authors
Froeb، Luke M. نويسنده , , Kobayashi، Bruce H. نويسنده ,
Issue Information
روزنامه با شماره پیاپی سال 2001
Pages
-266
From page
267
To page
0
Abstract
The advantage of the adversarial regime of judicial decision-making is the superior information of the parties, while the advantage of an idealized inquisitorial regime is its neutrality. We model the tradeoff by characterizing the properties of costly estimators used by each regime. The adversarial regime uses an `extremalʹ estimator that is based on the difference between the most favorable pieces of evidence produced by each party. The inquisitorial regime uses the sample mean. We find that neither regime dominates the other.
Keywords
Unemployment , Threshold models , Population shocks
Journal title
Economics Letters
Serial Year
2001
Journal title
Economics Letters
Record number
21641
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