Title of article
CFOs versus CEOs: Equity incentives and crashes
Author/Authors
Kim، نويسنده , , Jeong-Bon and Li، نويسنده , , Yinghua and Zhang، نويسنده , , Liandong، نويسنده ,
Issue Information
روزنامه با شماره پیاپی سال 2011
Pages
18
From page
713
To page
730
Abstract
Using a large sample of U.S. firms for the period 1993–2009, we provide evidence that the sensitivity of a chief financial officerʹs (CFO) option portfolio value to stock price is significantly and positively related to the firmʹs future stock price crash risk. In contrast, we find only weak evidence of the positive impact of chief executive officer option sensitivity on crash risk. Finally, we find that the link between CFO option sensitivity and crash risk is more pronounced for firms in non-competitive industries and those with a high level of financial leverage.
Keywords
Equity incentives , Crash risk , Corporate governance , compensation , CFO
Journal title
Journal of Financial Economics
Serial Year
2011
Journal title
Journal of Financial Economics
Record number
2212129
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