• Title of article

    Hypnotic ingroup–outgroup suggestion influences economic decision-making in an Ultimatum Game

  • Author/Authors

    Brüne، نويسنده , , Martin and Tas، نويسنده , , Cumhur and Wischniewski، نويسنده , , Julia and Welpinghus، نويسنده , , Anna and Heinisch، نويسنده , , Christine and Newen، نويسنده , , Albert، نويسنده ,

  • Issue Information
    روزنامه با شماره پیاپی سال 2012
  • Pages
    8
  • From page
    939
  • To page
    946
  • Abstract
    Studies in economic decision-making have demonstrated that individuals appreciate social values supporting equity and disapprove unfairness when distributing goods between two or more parties. However, this seems to critically depend on psychological mechanisms partly pertaining to the ingroup–outgroup distinction. Little is known as to what extent economic bargaining can be manipulated by means of psychological interventions such has hypnosis. Here we show that a hypnotic ingroup versus outgroup suggestion impacts the tolerance of unfairness in an Ultimatum Game. Specifically, the ingroup suggestion was associated with significantly greater acceptance rates of unfair offers than the outgroup suggestion, whereas hypnosis alone exerted only small effects on unfairness tolerance. These findings indicate that psychological interventions such as hypnotic suggestion can contribute to ingroup favoritism and outgroup rejection.
  • Keywords
    Ultimatum game , Economic bargaining , Tolerance of unfairness , Ingroup–outgroup distinction
  • Journal title
    Consciousness and Cognition
  • Serial Year
    2012
  • Journal title
    Consciousness and Cognition
  • Record number

    2292245