The referential theory of meaning and its criticisms: The case of fictional characters

One of the most important issues in the discussion of fictional propositions is the question of the semantic nature of such propositions in general and fictional names in particular. One approach to the discussion of fictional propositions has been the implementation of the Referential Theory of Meaning, which some believe is adequate to the explanation of fictional propositions. Being based on Wittgenstein s (1953) metaphor of the mirror, this theory envisages a direct relationship between ‘sense’, ‘reference’, and ‘referent’ to claim that a word is the linguistic representation of its real-world referent. The current paper provides a basic description of the referential theory of meaning. Four main issues are discussed: (a) the issue of existent and nonexistent objects, (b) the issue of reference and descriptive names, (c) transworld identity and counterpart theory, and (d) Stalnaker’s two-dimensional approach. The theoretical implications of each issue for the referential theory of meaning are discussed.