Title of article
Managerial Ownership Structure and Earnings Management
Author/Authors
Yang, Chi-Yih Minghsin University of Science and Technology, China , Yang, Chi-Yih Taiwan and Xian liaotong-Liverpool University, China , Lai, Hung-Neng National Central University, Taiwan , Tan, Boon Leing Xian liaotong-Liverpool University, China
From page
35
To page
53
Abstract
This study examines the relation between managerial ownership structure and earnings management. Unlike previous research which treats insiders as a homogeneous group, we further classify insiders into executives, outside directors, and blockholders to conduct an in-depth study, Earningsmanagement is captured by discretionary accruals that are estimated using the modified Jones model. For a large sample of Taiwanese listed firms over the period 1997 and 2004, we find that discretionary accruals first increase and then decrease with executive ownership, forming an inverted U-shapedrelationship. However, discretionary accruals are positively affected by director ownership and blockholder ownership. The results suggest that equity stake owned by top officers of a firm should be encouraged in order to reduce agency cost, thus enhancing information content of earnings.
Keywords
Agency Cost , Managerial Ownership , Earnings Management , Discretionary Accruals
Journal title
Journal of Financial Reporting and Accounting
Journal title
Journal of Financial Reporting and Accounting
Record number
2697225
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