• Title of article

    Managerial Ownership Structure and Earnings Management

  • Author/Authors

    Yang, Chi-Yih Minghsin University of Science and Technology, China , Yang, Chi-Yih Taiwan and Xian liaotong-Liverpool University, China , Lai, Hung-Neng National Central University, Taiwan , Tan, Boon Leing Xian liaotong-Liverpool University, China

  • From page
    35
  • To page
    53
  • Abstract
    This study examines the relation between managerial ownership structure and earnings management. Unlike previous research which treats insiders as a homogeneous group, we further classify insiders into executives, outside directors, and blockholders to conduct an in-depth study, Earningsmanagement is captured by discretionary accruals that are estimated using the modified Jones model. For a large sample of Taiwanese listed firms over the period 1997 and 2004, we find that discretionary accruals first increase and then decrease with executive ownership, forming an inverted U-shapedrelationship. However, discretionary accruals are positively affected by director ownership and blockholder ownership. The results suggest that equity stake owned by top officers of a firm should be encouraged in order to reduce agency cost, thus enhancing information content of earnings.
  • Keywords
    Agency Cost , Managerial Ownership , Earnings Management , Discretionary Accruals
  • Journal title
    Journal of Financial Reporting and Accounting
  • Journal title
    Journal of Financial Reporting and Accounting
  • Record number

    2697225