Evaluating the Effects of the Audit Committee's Characteristics on Voluntarily Disclosure of Information in Tehran Agricultural Stock Exchange

Separating ownership from managing, and conflicting interests of owners as brokers and managers cause agency problems and therefore, information asymmetry. One way to reduce these conflicting interests is to disclose information voluntarily beyond what is provided by companies, which improves the relationship between owners and managers. The purpose of this study is to evaluate the effects of the audit committee's characteristics on the voluntary disclosure of information (VDI) in companies listed on the Tehran Agricultural Stock Exchange in 2013-2016. VDI as a mechanism to reduce information asymmetry between managers and people outside companies reduces agency costs and improves the reports' transparency. To measure the amount of VDI in an annual reporting, a list of VDI was prepared by studying the accounting standards and rules governing the information reporting process measured by the Botosan checklist. Characteristics of the audit committee (AC), which referred to its independence, expertise, and size, were evaluated in 81 companies listed on the Tehran Agricultural Stock Exchange over three years. It was found that only the size of the audit committee had a positive significant effect on the VDI, but no significant relationship was observed between its independence and expertise with the VDI.