Title of article
Condorcet winners on four candidates with anonymous voters
Author/Authors
William V. Gehrlein، نويسنده ,
Issue Information
روزنامه با شماره پیاپی سال 2001
Pages
6
From page
335
To page
340
Abstract
May’s Theorem is extended to four-candidate elections with the Impartial Anonymous Culture Condition (IAC) to obtain a closed form representation for the probability, P(4, n, IAC), that a Condorcet winner exists for odd n voters. Representations of this type are found to become much more cumbersome for four-candidate elections, as compared to the relatively elegant results that are obtained for three-candidate elections. The precise limiting probability P(4, ∞, IAC)=1717/2048=0.8384 is found to be slightly different than previously reported Monte-Carlo simulation results, and the limiting value is approached very quickly for n at all large.
Keywords
Condorcet winner
Journal title
Economics Letters
Serial Year
2001
Journal title
Economics Letters
Record number
434791
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