• Title of article

    Condorcet winners on four candidates with anonymous voters

  • Author/Authors

    William V. Gehrlein، نويسنده ,

  • Issue Information
    روزنامه با شماره پیاپی سال 2001
  • Pages
    6
  • From page
    335
  • To page
    340
  • Abstract
    May’s Theorem is extended to four-candidate elections with the Impartial Anonymous Culture Condition (IAC) to obtain a closed form representation for the probability, P(4, n, IAC), that a Condorcet winner exists for odd n voters. Representations of this type are found to become much more cumbersome for four-candidate elections, as compared to the relatively elegant results that are obtained for three-candidate elections. The precise limiting probability P(4, ∞, IAC)=1717/2048=0.8384 is found to be slightly different than previously reported Monte-Carlo simulation results, and the limiting value is approached very quickly for n at all large.
  • Keywords
    Condorcet winner
  • Journal title
    Economics Letters
  • Serial Year
    2001
  • Journal title
    Economics Letters
  • Record number

    434791