• Title of article

    Cournot outcome and optimal collusion: an example

  • Author/Authors

    Harrison Cheng، نويسنده ,

  • Issue Information
    روزنامه با شماره پیاپی سال 2001
  • Pages
    8
  • From page
    1
  • To page
    8
  • Abstract
    We give an example of a repeated Cournot oligopoly game with price uncertainty in which the optimal collusion is the Cournot outcome. Thus there is no advantage from dynamic collusion. The example is quite robust with respect to probability specifications and the number of firms
  • Keywords
    Cournot outcome , Dynamic oligopoly , Collusion
  • Journal title
    Economics Letters
  • Serial Year
    2001
  • Journal title
    Economics Letters
  • Record number

    434835