Title of article
Auctions with synergies and asymmetric buyers
Author/Authors
Flavio M. Menezes، نويسنده , , Paulo K. Monteiro، نويسنده ,
Issue Information
روزنامه با شماره پیاپی سال 2004
Pages
8
From page
287
To page
294
Abstract
In this paper we consider sequential auctions with synergies where one player wants two objects and the remaining players want one object each. We show that expected prices may not necessarily decrease as predicted by Branco [Econ. Lett. 54 (1997) 159]. Indeed we show that expected prices can actually increase.
Keywords
Asymmetric sequential auctions , Synergies
Journal title
Economics Letters
Serial Year
2004
Journal title
Economics Letters
Record number
435547
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