Title of article
Optimal health insurance contract: Is a deductible useful?
Author/Authors
David Bardey، نويسنده , , Romain Lesur، نويسنده ,
Issue Information
روزنامه با شماره پیاپی سال 2005
Pages
5
From page
313
To page
317
Abstract
According to insurance theory, agents who have insurance coverage have less incentives to make preventive actions. In this paper, we argue that the optimality of a deductible [Shavell, S., 1979. On moral hazard and insurance, Quarterly Journal of Economics 93, 541–562.] cannot be extended to the health insurance sector.
Keywords
Health insurance , Ex ante moral hazard , Bi-dimensional , Utility function , Deductible , Preventive actions
Journal title
Economics Letters
Serial Year
2005
Journal title
Economics Letters
Record number
435674
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