• Title of article

    Market structure, scrappage, and moral hazard

  • Author/Authors

    Susanna Esteban، نويسنده , , Gerard Llobet، نويسنده ,

  • Issue Information
    روزنامه با شماره پیاپی سال 2005
  • Pages
    6
  • From page
    203
  • To page
    208
  • Abstract
    In the presence of moral hazard, the optimal contract for a durable-goods monopolist is a lease with an option to buy. This contract is optimal regardless of the monopolistʹs ability to commit and creates inefficient scrappage
  • Keywords
    Scrappage , Maintenance , Durability , Monopoly , Moral hazard
  • Journal title
    Economics Letters
  • Serial Year
    2005
  • Journal title
    Economics Letters
  • Record number

    435724

    • Link To Document
    https://search.isc.ac/dl/search/defaultta.aspx?DTC=10&DC=435724