Title of article
The suboptimality of optimal punishments in Cournot supergames
Author/Authors
Luca Colombo، نويسنده , , Paola Labrecciosa، نويسنده ,
Issue Information
روزنامه با شماره پیاپی سال 2006
Pages
6
From page
116
To page
121
Abstract
We investigate, within a Cournot supergame, whether optimal punishments may become suboptimal when economies of scale are not negligible. We show that, for sufficiently strong increasing returns to scale, the critical discount factor associated to grim trigger strategies is lower than the one associated to optimal penal codes.
Keywords
Optimal punishments , trigger strategies , Cartel stability , Scale economies , Security level
Journal title
Economics Letters
Serial Year
2006
Journal title
Economics Letters
Record number
435835
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