Individual differences in rational and intuitive thinking styles as predictors of heuristic responses and framing effects

Two studies were conducted to test the hypothesis that heuristic responses can be predicted from variance in two ‘thinking stylesʹ, rational-analytic and experiential-intuitive, as defined by the cognitive-experiential self-theory [CEST; Epstein, S. (1983), The unconscious, the preconscious and the self-concept. In J. Suls, & A. Greenwald, Psychological perspectives on the self (Vol. 2, pp. 219–247). Hillsdale, N.J.: Lawrence Erlbaum. Epstein, S. (1990). Cognitive-experiential self-theory. In: L. Pervin, Handbook of personality theory and research. (pp. 165–192), New York: Guilford. Epstein, S. (1994). An integration of the cognitive and psychodynamic unconscious. American Psychologist, 49, 709–724. Epstein, S. (1998a). Cognitive-experiential self theory: A dual-process personality theory with implications for diagnosis and psychotherapy. In: R.F. Bornstein & J.M. Masling, Empirical perspectives on the psychoanalytic unconscious. (pp. 99–140), Washington, D.C.: American Psychological Association]. Study 1 demonstrated systematic individual differences in participantsʹ normative-statistical versus heuristic responses to judgmental tasks requiring the assessment of chances for the next event in a sequence. Normative-statistical responses were found to be correlated positively with rational thinking style, and negatively with experiential-intuitive thinking style. In study 2, these thinking styles were tested in relation to framing effects [Tversky, A., & Kahneman, D. (1981) The framing of decisions and the psychology of choice. Science, 211, 453–458.]. A 2×2×2 between-subjects experiment was designed with 2 (high/low rational) × 2 (high/low intuitive) × 2 (positive/negative frame) as independent variables, and the tendency to choose non-risky options as the dependent variable. The results showed that specific combinations of thinking styles, high rational/high intuitive and low rational/low intuitive, were the ones most prone to framing effects. The findings were interpreted as supporting the individual-differences perspective on heuristic processing, and as a validation of main assumptions of CEST. Implications regarding individual differences in thinking styles and the interactions between them were discussed.