• Title of article

    Justice sensitivity and distributive decisions in experimental games

  • Author/Authors

    Detlef Fetchenhauer، نويسنده , , Xu Huang، نويسنده ,

  • Issue Information
    روزنامه با شماره پیاپی سال 2004
  • Pages
    15
  • From page
    1015
  • To page
    1029
  • Abstract
    The concept of “justice sensitivity” has been introduced as a personality disposition by Schmitt, Neumann and Montada (1995) and is supposed to explain inter-individual differences in reactions to unfair situations. Justice sensitivity can be differentiated in three subdimensions: (1) Sensitivity with regard to experiencing injustice towards oneself (JSVictim), (2) sensitivity to observing that others are treated unfairly (JSObserver) and, (3) sensitivity to profiting from unfair events (JSPerpetrator). Using a sample of 190 university students the three dimensions of justice sensitivity were used to predict decisions in a number of game theoretical paradigms (dictator games, ultimatum games and a combination of these two games). The higher respondents scored on both JSObserver and JSPerpetrator, the more their decisions followed norms of equality. The contrary was true for JSVictim. The implications of these findings for future research using the concept of justice sensitivity are discussed.
  • Keywords
    Justice sensitivity , Ultimatum games , Dictator games , fairness
  • Journal title
    Personality and Individual Differences
  • Serial Year
    2004
  • Journal title
    Personality and Individual Differences
  • Record number

    457330