The concept of disorder as a foundation for the DSMʹs theory-neutral nosology: response to Follette and Houts, part 2

Follette and Houts [Follette, W. C., Houts, A. C. (1996). Models of scientific progress and the role of theory in taxonomy development: a case study of the DSM. Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology, 64, 1120–1132] argue that ‘mental disorder’ and ‘function’ are value concepts that offer no scientific basis for the DSMʹs theory-neutral nosology or for distinguishing disorders from other behavioral problems. They also claim that the DSM presupposes a biological theory of etiology, thus is not really theory-neutral. They recommend replacing the DSM by theory-laden diagnostic manuals. I argue: (1) DSM criteria do not imply a biological model of disorder, (2) ‘mental disorder’ and ‘function’ have scientific content that allows one to distinguish disorder from nondisorder, (3) the evolutionary ‘harmful dysfunction’ analysis of disorder [Wakefield, J. C. (1992a). The concept of mental disorder: on the boundary between biological facts and social values. American Psychologist, 47, 373–388] coherently demarcates disorder from nondisorder, (4) the proposed behaviorist alternative to the DSM illustrated by the articles in Folletteʹs special section [Follette, W. C. (Ed.) (1996a). Special section on the development of theoretically coherent alternatives to the DSM system. Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology, 64, 1117–1201] is incoherent because it does not distinguish disorder from nondisorder.