International criminal bodies

One of the insights of Constructivism is that our world is, in part, made by whatwe say about it. We make things what they are by saying what they are. One way is throughthe use of metaphor; by asserting that one thing is another thing. Does our saying that astate is a person make it a person?A way to intervene in this discussion is by addressing it not in the abstract, but guidedby a cognate question: Can states commit crimes, a uniquely human act? If states cancommit and be liable for crimes, they must be able to form intents. If they are indeedpersons in the relevant sense, this is no problem; if their personality is trope, however,attribution of criminal responsibility becomes tenuous.To analyse the issue, I trace the development of the trope of speaking of a group as ifit were an individual from Roman Law, through to Hobbes, corporate law and IR Theory.Much hinges on Hobbes’ elision of ‘body’ and ‘person’. I conclude that it is too much toexpect of a metaphor that it act, that it have reasons, beliefs, and desires, and that these sumto intentions.