Title of article
Studying Maximum Information Leakage Using Karush–Kuhn–Tucker Conditions
Author/Authors
Han Chen، نويسنده , , Pasquale Malacaria، نويسنده ,
Issue Information
روزنامه با شماره پیاپی سال 2009
Pages
15
From page
1
To page
15
Abstract
As emphasized in the existing literature, no electronic system can guarantee perfect confidentiality or anonymity [19]. Hence, measuring the leakage of confidential information is a pressing but increasingly challenging issue. The ability to preemptively assess possible information leaks is crucial for designing and understanding a system that contains information which ought to be protected [1].Information Theory [25] provides a general method for measuring information flow in information channels, and extends to quantify the loss of confidentiality and anonymity. A number of previous works have addressed and measured the channel capacity of information leakage channels, which describes the worst-case leakage. Recently a novel technique to measure the channel capacity of anonymity protocols and programs using Lagrange multipliers has been proposed in [21, 7]: this setting is able to answer questions like: "what is the maximum leakage of a system where a random string is 1000 times less likely to be the secret than a dictionary word" i.e. an equality constraint like prand = lOOOpH^.1In order to analyze a much wider range of systems and scenarios, inequality constraints ought to be supported. An example of such constraint is: "the password is over 1000 times more likely to be a word from a dictionary than a meaningless string", i.e. prand < 1OOOpword: these inequality constraints cannot be solved using lagrangians. Therefore, we introduce Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) conditions to enable inequality constraints for deriving the channel capacity, and present a set of theorems and propositions which can be readily applied. This makes the approach more powerful and enables it to deal with a much wider spectrum of cases, as demonstrated later on in this paper. Further, we believe that this approach, orthogonal to the probabilistic methods which have dominated protocol security analysis [12, 11, 24], will provide novel and more practical results to the research community.The paper is organized as follows: the next subsection discusses existing literature and the background is introduced in Section 2. In Section 3, we briefly describe the theorems and propositions for channel capacity using Karush-Kuhn-Tucker conditions with full proofs. We show that our method can
Journal title
Electronic Proceedings in Theoretical Computer Science
Serial Year
2009
Journal title
Electronic Proceedings in Theoretical Computer Science
Record number
679735
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