Rashomon in Jerusalem: Mapping the Israeli Negotiatorsʹ Positions on the Israeli–Palestinian Peace Process, 1993–2001

To understand the complexities and dilemmas of the Israeli–Palestinian conflict this paper maps the divergent Israeli positions along the route of the ‘‘Oslo’’ peace process of 1993–2001, including the negotiations at Camp David (July 2000), and Taba (January 2001). This paper is based upon a qualitative content analysis of 20 in-depth interviews conducted in 2002 and 2003 at the Leonard Davis Institute for International Relations at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem with a broad range of Israeli negotiators, including senior politicians, foreign ministry officials, senior military officers, former members of the security services, and political aides. This paper tackles the question of how Israelis who were directly involved in the peace process now evaluate it, offering a portrait of how sharply at odds were the various perceptions of what happened and who was responsible for the ultimate failure