Institutional analysis of evolution of joint forest management in India: A new institutional economics approach

This paper analyzes the evolution of the Joint Forest Management (JFM) institution in India in the light of the New Institutional Economics. To structure the analysis and shed light on different sources of persistent problems related to JFM, the paper uses the ‘four levels of institutional analysis’ framework developed by Williamson. In this paper we focus particularly on level 2 and 3. The second level of institutional analysis refers to the institutional environment (‘formal rules of the game’). We argue that the shift from state to co-management is a step in the right direction given the realities encountered in India. The insecure, incomplete and often incoherent transfer of specific rights from the state to local communities is, however, an important source of incentive problems on the part of communities. The third level of institutional analysis deals with the governance of contractual relations (‘play of the game’). Here, the interactions between forest departments and communities are discussed at a more disaggregate level. It is shown that information asymmetries and lack of accountability lead to a prevalence of enforcement problems and rent-seeking activities, putting into question the efficiency of the current system. We conclude with policy recommendations and issues for future research.