An empirical analysis of the economic impact of federal terrorism reinsurance$

This paper examines the role of the federal government in the market for terrorism reinsurance. We investigate the stock price response of affectedind ustries to a sequence of 13 events culminating in the enactment of the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act (TRIA) of 2002. In the industries most likely to be affected by TRIA—banking, construction, insurance, real estate investment trusts, transportation, andpublic utilities–the stock price effect was primarily negative. The Act was at best value-neutral for property-casualty insurers because it eliminatedthe option not to offer terrorism insurance. The negative response of the other industries may be attributable to the Act’s impeding more efficient private market solutions, failing to address nuclear, chemical, and biological hazards, and reducing market expectations of federal assistance following future terrorist attacks. r 2004 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.