• Title of article

    Risk and concentration in payment and securities settlement systems

  • Author/Authors

    David C. Mills Jr.، نويسنده , , Travis D. Nesmith، نويسنده ,

  • Issue Information
    روزنامه با شماره پیاپی سال 2008
  • Pages
    12
  • From page
    542
  • To page
    553
  • Abstract
    What drives the intraday patterns of settlement in payment and securities settlement systems? Using a model of the strategic interaction of participants in these systems to capture some stylized facts about the Federal Reserve’s Fedwire funds and securities systems, this paper identifies three factors that influence a participant’s decision on when to send transactions intraday: cost of intraday liquidity, extent of settlement risk, and system design. With these factors, the model can make predictions regarding the impact of policy on the concentration of transactions, amount of intraday overdrafts, central bank credit exposure, costs to system participants, and other risks. Published by Elsevier B.V.
  • Keywords
    Strategic games , Bank behavior , Interbank payments , Securities settlement
  • Journal title
    Journal of Monetary Economics
  • Serial Year
    2008
  • Journal title
    Journal of Monetary Economics
  • Record number

    846198