Title of article
U.S.taxpolicyandhealthinsurancedemand:Canaregressivepolicy improvewelfare
Author/Authors
KarstenJeske، نويسنده ,
Issue Information
روزنامه با شماره پیاپی سال 2008
Pages
12
From page
210
To page
221
Abstract
The U.S.taxpolicyonhealthinsuranceisregressivebecauseitsubsidizesonlythose
offeredgroupinsurancethroughtheiremployers,whoalsotendtohavearelativelyhigh
income.Moreover,thesubsidytakestheformofdeductionsfromtheprogressive
incometaxsystemgivinghighincomeearnersalargersubsidy.Tounderstand
theeffectofthepolicy,weconstructadynamicgeneralequilibriummodelwith
heterogenousagentsandanendogenousdemandforhealthinsurance.Acomplete
removalofthesubsidymayleadtoapartialcollapseofthegroupinsurancemarket,
reduce theinsurancecoverageanddeterioratewelfare.Thereis,however,roomfor
improvingthecoverageandwelfarebyextendingarefundablecredittotheindividual
insurancemarket
Keywords
Health insuranceRisk-sharingTaxpolicy
Journal title
Journal of Monetary Economics
Serial Year
2008
Journal title
Journal of Monetary Economics
Record number
846286
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