Title of article
Sovereigndebtauctions:Uniformordiscriminatory?
Author/Authors
Menachem Brenner، نويسنده ,
Issue Information
روزنامه با شماره پیاپی سال 2008
Pages
8
From page
267
To page
274
Abstract
Manyfinancialassets,especiallygovernmentbonds,areissuedbyanauction.An
importantfeatureofthedesignistheauctionpricingmechanism:uniformversus
discriminatory.Theoreticalpapersdonotprovideadefiniteanswerregardingthe
dominanceofonetypeofauctionovertheother.Weinvestigatetherevealed
preferences oftheissuersbysurveyingthesovereignissuersthatconductauctions.
Wefindthatthemajorityoftheissuers/countriesinoursampleuseadiscriminatory
auction mechanismforissuinggovernmentdebt.Weuseamultinomiallogitprocedure
and discriminatoryanalysistoinvestigatethemechanismchoice.Itwasinterestingto
find thatmarket-orientedeconomiesandthosethatpracticecommonlawtendtousea
uniform methodwhileeconomieswhoarelessmarketorientedandpracticecivillaw
tend tousediscriminatorypriceauctions
Keywords
UniformauctionDiscriminatory auctionTreasurybondsT-bills
Journal title
Journal of Monetary Economics
Serial Year
2008
Journal title
Journal of Monetary Economics
Record number
846290
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