The study of the impacts of potential coalitions on bidding strategies of GENCOs

The paper studies the impacts of potential coalitions on bidding strategies of GENCOs in a pool-based power market. The generator under consideration can form any potential coalition with other generators. Subgroups are then formed and each of these subgroups consists of some members which coordinate their bidding strategies to achieve a common goal. Noncooperative gaming applies among all the subgroups while cooperative gaming applies among the members in each subgroup. By implementation of bids sensitivities the paper presents an algorithm for the members in each coalition subgroup to obtain optimal bids, which essentially is based on interior point optimal power flow (IPOPF) model. A priority list, produced after optimal bids are found for all the potential combinations of coalition, is used by the generator under consideration to bargain with members on the list. The algorithm and model are tested by the IEEE 30-bus system and numerical results are presented.