Regulatory performance analysis case study: Britainʹs electricity industry

The success or failure of the privatisation and liberalisation of electricity supply industries has more often been judged in terms of process than of outcomes. In this paper, in contrast, this performance is assessed in terms of the performance of its associated system of regulatory governance. Taking the UKʹs electricity supply industry between 1989 and 2000 as case study, initially, a vertical cross-section of the regulation system gives a finding matrix for the various stakeholders involved and identifying winners and losers from the standpoint of funding flows. Next, a horizontal cross-section provides the environmental, distributive, allocative, dynamic and productive efficiencies grid for this system. The survey shows that the performance of the British ESI regulation system produced benefits, although not for all stakeholders and not as fairly as possible. The chosen path did not seem sustainable and failed to respect intergenerational transfers as a way of fostering sustainability and equity. It was unable to underpin simultaneous improvements in efficiencies over time, while redistributing industryʹs funding flows among the players in a regressive manner.