THE POSSIBILITY OF ‘VALUABLE ACTION’ IN KANT’S ETHICS

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Kant propounds to search and determine “the supreme principle of morality’ as the primary aim of his work on morality. This aim seems like a continuance of an old tradition ongoing from ancient philosophy in ethics. For, while it is being discussed what the final end of an action is since antiquity, it is attempted to demonstrate that there is a basic principle that guides human actions; that is, it is attempted to answer the question whether or not different principles can be reduced to a single principle as a result. However, this opinion prevents the correct understanding of Kantian ethics and the possibility of valuable action in his ethics; because, for him, “the supreme principle of morality” is not a principle for our actions, but the principle of our wills. According to Kant, “morality is the relation of actions to the autonomy of the will, that is, to the possible universal legislation through its maxims.” For Kant, it seems to be important to will in accordance with the moral law. This paper aims to show that Kantian ethics cannot be considered as a normative ethics; and based on this thought, it is intended to demonstrate that the moral law is the possibility of valuable action, namely, of the supreme principle of morality.

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Good , Will , Moral Law , Duty , Respect , Action , Value , Valuable

Pamukkale University Journal Of Social Sciences Institute

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Pamukkale University Journal Of Social Sciences Institute