3541191

3180

This article incorporates a political decision process into an urban land use model to predict the likely location of a public good. It fills an important gap in the literature by modeling the endogenous location of open space. The article compares open space decisions made under a majority rules voting scheme with welfare-improving criterion and finds households tied to a location in space compete for public goods. Significant differences emerge between the two decision criteria, indicating that requiring referenda for open space decisions is likely to lead to inefficient outcomes. Specifically, many open space votes are likely to fail that would lead to welfare improvements, and any open space decisions that do pass will require amenities larger than needed to achieve the social optimum. The more dispersed and large the population, the larger the gap between the socially efficient level and the level needed for a public referendum to pass.

1723

open space , Voting , Land use , Referendum , Spatial economics

Studia Iranica

1730

1730