DocumentCode
1230232
Title
Temperature Attacks
Author
Brouchier, JUlien ; Kean, Tom ; Marsh, Carol ; Naccache, David
Volume
7
Issue
2
fYear
2009
Firstpage
79
Lastpage
82
Abstract
Confining a program during its execution so that it can´t leak information to other programs is an old concern. Recently, several researchers succeeded in fingerprinting distant machines by measuring temperature side effects on clocks. But can temperature also leak secrets in a computer or a chip? We started by implementing a covert channel between two processes (a sender and a receiver) running on the same machine. Producing heat is simple: all the sender must do is launch massive calculations. To sense temperature in the machine, we considered three options: fan-based solutions, built-in sensors; and faults as heat detectors.
Keywords
temperature sensors; built-in sensors; covert channel; distant machines; fan-based solutions; fingerprinting; heat detectors; machine temperature sensing; program confining; temperature attacks; temperature side effects; Circuit synthesis; Control systems; Cryptography; Field programmable gate arrays; Privacy; Process control; Protection; Security; Temperature; Tuning; attack; covert channel; crypto corner; heat; information leakage; side channel; temperature;
fLanguage
English
Journal_Title
Security & Privacy, IEEE
Publisher
ieee
ISSN
1540-7993
Type
jour
DOI
10.1109/MSP.2009.54
Filename
4812164
Link To Document