The Impact of Incomplete Information on Games in Parallel Relay Networks

Author

Xiao, Hongda ; Yeh, Edmund M.

Author_Institution

Dept. of Electr. Eng., Yale Univ., New Haven, CT, USA

Volume

30

Issue

1

fYear

2012

fDate

1/1/2012 12:00:00 AM

Firstpage

176

Lastpage

187

Abstract

This paper considers the impact of incomplete information on incentives for node cooperation in parallel relay networks with one source node, one destination node, and multiple relay nodes. All nodes are selfish and strategic, interested in maximizing their own profit instead of the social welfare. The paper considers the practical situation where the channel state on any given relay path is not observable to the source or to the other relays. Different bargaining relationships between the source and the relays are considered, and a framework for studying the efficiency loss induced by incomplete information is proposed. The source of the efficiency loss is analyzed, and the amount of inefficiency which results is quantified.

Keywords

cooperative communication; game theory; profitability; relays; wireless channels; channel state; game theory; incomplete information impact; multiple relay node; parallel relay network; relay path; social welfare; source node cooperation; Bayesian methods; Cost function; Games; Nash equilibrium; Pricing; Relays; Resource management; Bayesian nash equilibrium; Pricing; game theory; incentives; incomplete information; price of anarchy; relay networks;

fLanguage

English

Journal_Title

Selected Areas in Communications, IEEE Journal on

Publisher

ieee

ISSN

0733-8716

Type

jour

DOI

10.1109/JSAC.2012.120116

Filename

6117772