Game of Risk Communications—The Case of a Japanese Carmaker

In this paper, game models for risk information disclosure-which interpret user payoff structures according to March and Simon´s theory of satisficing decision making and interpret a carmaker´s payoff structures according to Tversky and Kahneman´s cumulative prospect theory-are developed. This risk information disclosure game is used to analyze the recall of products by a carmaker. The transitions made from one game to another correspond to the carmaker´s subjective risk assessment of the probability that nondisclosure will be discovered by the user. The user´s claims hasten the carmaker´s change from a nondisclosure game to another kind of game. The role of a guardian agent in fault information disclosure is examined. The presence of an agent caused the carmaker playing the game to change from nondisclosure to disclosure mode. From the viewpoint of operational cost, the risk information disclosure in an environment where a permanent guardian agent is always active is considered to be effective in achieving good risk communications.