DocumentCode
1657038
Title
Notice of Retraction
Board independence, executive overconfidence and financial leverage
Author
Yan Yong-hai ; Kong Yu-sheng
Author_Institution
Sch. of Finance & Econ., Jiangsu Univ., Zhenjiang, China
Volume
3
fYear
2010
Firstpage
364
Lastpage
368
Abstract
Notice of Retraction
After careful and considered review of the content of this paper by a duly constituted expert committee, this paper has been found to be in violation of IEEE´s Publication Principles.
We hereby retract the content of this paper. Reasonable effort should be made to remove all past references to this paper.
The presenting author of this paper has the option to appeal this decision by contacting TPII@ieee.org.
Based on the managerial overconfidence hypothesis in behavioral corporate finance,the paper studies the effect of executive confidence on corporate financing decisions. The empirical results indicate that there is an obvious positive correlation between executive overconfidence and capital structure, executive overconfidence can enhances corporate financial leverage ratio. But board independence can curb executive overconfidence,the more independent board is, the more restrained executive overconfidence is, and the positive relationship between executive overconfidence and financial leverage is much weaker.
After careful and considered review of the content of this paper by a duly constituted expert committee, this paper has been found to be in violation of IEEE´s Publication Principles.
We hereby retract the content of this paper. Reasonable effort should be made to remove all past references to this paper.
The presenting author of this paper has the option to appeal this decision by contacting TPII@ieee.org.
Based on the managerial overconfidence hypothesis in behavioral corporate finance,the paper studies the effect of executive confidence on corporate financing decisions. The empirical results indicate that there is an obvious positive correlation between executive overconfidence and capital structure, executive overconfidence can enhances corporate financial leverage ratio. But board independence can curb executive overconfidence,the more independent board is, the more restrained executive overconfidence is, and the positive relationship between executive overconfidence and financial leverage is much weaker.
Keywords
financial management; behavioral corporate finance; board independence; capital structure; corporate financial leverage ratio; corporate financing decision; executive overconfidence; managerial overconfidence hypothesis; Bismuth; Educational institutions; Investments; Size measurement; board independence; capital structure; executive overconfidence; financing decision;
fLanguage
English
Publisher
ieee
Conference_Titel
Advanced Management Science (ICAMS), 2010 IEEE International Conference on
Conference_Location
Chengdu
Print_ISBN
978-1-4244-6931-4
Type
conf
DOI
10.1109/ICAMS.2010.5553222
Filename
5553222
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