Notice of RetractionGovernment procurement game and procurement corruption

Notice of Retraction

After careful and considered review of the content of this paper by a duly constituted expert committee, this paper has been found to be in violation of IEEE´s Publication Principles.

We hereby retract the content of this paper. Reasonable effort should be made to remove all past references to this paper.

The presenting author of this paper has the option to appeal this decision by contacting TPII@ieee.org.

China has started the government procurement law and practice since 1990s. Although there were many successful cases, the increased corruption has plagued its sustainability. With some flawed design of government procurement mechanism, the centralized procurement has witnessed more corruption than the decentralized one. This paper explores the government procurement process and procurement corruption from a game-theoretic perspective of view. This paper demonstrates that the process of government procurement is a principal-agent game between procurer, procurement agent, the firms and other interest groups, and the formation and evolution of procurement regime is a process of dynamic game. Procurement corruption grows from the negotiable procurement rents created during the procurement game. Due to the procurement cost and negotiation capability, the firms, instead of the consumers will gain the procurement rents. Thus in order to curb the corruption, multiple methods, such as the lawyer´s approach, businessman´s approach and market of economist´s approach, should be applied.