Key Updating for Leakage Resiliency With Application to AES Modes of Operation

Side-channel analysis (SCA) exploits the information leaked through unintentional outputs (e.g., power consumption) to reveal the secret key of cryptographic modules. The real threat of SCA lies in the ability to mount attacks over small parts of the key and to aggregate information over different encryptions. The threat of SCA can be thwarted by changing the secret key at every run. Indeed, many contributions in the domain of leakage resilient cryptography tried to achieve this goal. However, the proposed solutions were computationally intensive and were not designed to solve the problem of the current cryptographic schemes. In this paper, we propose a generic framework of lightweight key updating that can protect the current cryptographic standards and evaluate the minimum requirements for heuristic SCA-security. Then, we propose a complete solution to protect the implementation of any standard mode of Advanced Encryption Standard. Our solution maintains the same level of SCA-security (and sometimes better) as the state of the art, at a negligible area overhead while doubling the throughput of the best previous work.