Securing underwater acoustic communications through analog network coding

We propose a new secure underwater acoustic communication scheme designed to let a user (Alice) transmit a confidential message to another user (Bob) in the presence of an eavesdropper (Eve). A typical approach in conventional wireless physical-layer security is to rely on a friendly jammer to jam Eve through artificial noise (AN). Instead, for the first time, we propose a secure underwater communication scheme that relies on cooperative friendly jamming through CDMA-based analog network coding (ANC). The cooperative friendly jammer transmits information using the same spreading code used in the legitimate Alice-Bob link. The information transmitted by the cooperative jammer is known a priori to Bob, but not to Eve. Although the jammer´s packet will also interfere at Bob, we show that after jointly estimating the two multipath-affected channels, Bob can suppress the interfering packet and decode Alice´s packet, while Eve cannot. We also formulate the problem of joint optimal selection of friendly jammer and power allocation (for Alice and the jammer) that minimize Eve´s capability of intercepting the signal while guaranteeing a predefined level of quality of service (QoS) for Bob. The proposed scheme is implemented in a testbed based on Teledyne Benthos Telesonar SM-975 underwater modems and tested extensively in Lake LaSalle at the University at Buffalo. Experiments and simulations demonstrate that, for a given energy budget, the proposed scheme can guarantee much higher bit error rate (BER) at Eve, while creating minimal BER disturbance at Bob, compared to the AN-aided approach.