Electromagnetic analysis and fault injection onto secure circuits

Author

Maistri, P. ; Leveugle, R. ; Bossuet, L. ; Aubert, A. ; Fischer, V. ; Robisson, B. ; Moro, N. ; Maurine, P. ; Dutertre, J.-M. ; Lisart, M.

Author_Institution

TIMA, Univ. Grenoble Alpes, Grenoble, France

fYear

2014

fDate

6-8 Oct. 2014

Firstpage

1

Lastpage

6

Abstract

Implementation attacks are a major threat to hardware cryptographic implementations. These attacks exploit the correlation existing between the computed data and variables such as computation time, consumed power, and electromagnetic (EM) emissions. Recently, the EM channel has been proven as an effective passive and active attack technique against secure implementations. In this paper, we resume the recent results obtained on this subject, with a particular focus on EM as a fault injection tool.

Keywords

cryptography; electromagnetic compatibility; fault diagnosis; network analysis; EM emissions; active attack technique; electromagnetic analysis; electromagnetic emissions; fault injection tool; hardware cryptography; implementation attacks; secure circuits; Circuit faults; Clocks; Cryptography; Electromagnetics; Generators; Harmonic analysis; Probes; EM; Fault Attacks; Secure implementations; Side Channel Analysis;

fLanguage

English

Publisher

ieee

Conference_Titel

Very Large Scale Integration (VLSI-SoC), 2014 22nd International Conference on

Conference_Location

Playa del Carmen

Type

conf

DOI

10.1109/VLSI-SoC.2014.7004182

Filename

7004182