Fuzzy approaches to two-decision-maker games

A unique fuzzy approach is developed to model uncertainties in the preferences of a decision maker involved in a conflict. Human judgments, including expressing preferences over a set of feasible outcomes or states in a conflict, are usually imprecise. Situations characterized by vagueness, impreciseness, incompleteness and ambiguity, are often reflected in the decision maker´s preferences. When modeling a conflict, it is assumed that the decision makers, the courses of actions available for each, and the preferences of each decision maker are known. When the preferences of the decision maker over a certain set of actions are not known with certainty, this could affect the overall equilibria which are predicted in an analysis. Hence, fuzzy logic is used to handle imprecise or vague preference information so that realistic equilibria can be found. The well-known game of Prisoner´s Dilemma, in which one must decide whether or not to cooperate, is employed as an illustrative application to demonstrate how the fuzzy preference methodology works in practice.