Vulnerabilities of RFID Security Protocol Based on Chaotic Maps

Many RFID authentication protocols have been proposed to provide desired security and privacy level for RFID systems. Almost all of these protocols are based on symmetric cryptography because of the limited resources of RFID tags. Recently Cheng et. Al have proposed an RFID security protocol based on chaotic maps. In this paper, we analyse the security of this protocol and discover its vulnerabilities. We firstly present a de-synchronization attack in which a passive adversary makes the shared secrets out-of-synchronization by eavesdropping just one protocol session. We secondly present a secret disclosure attack in which a passive adversary extracts secrets of a tag by eavesdropping just one protocol session. An adversary having the secrets of the tag can launch some other attacks. Finally, we propose modifications to Cheng et. Al´s protocol to eliminate its vulnerabilities.