• DocumentCode
    1859320
  • Title

    Negotiation with incomplete information about worth: strict versus tolerant mechanisms

  • Author

    Zlotkin, Gilad ; Rosenschein, Jeffrey S.

  • Author_Institution
    Dept. of Comput. Sci., Hebrew Univ., Jerusalem, Israel
  • fYear
    1993
  • fDate
    12-14 May 1993
  • Firstpage
    175
  • Lastpage
    184
  • Abstract
    In the domain of distributed AI (DAI), two negotiation mechanisms (one strict and one tolerant), and a negotiation strategy, for the situation where agents´ goals are common knowledge, but the worths they attach to those goals are private are presented. All possible prototypical classes of (non-conflict) encounters are analyzed, and it is shown where the strategy and mechanisms result in stable and/or efficient solutions. In most cases, the negotiation strategy is both stable and efficient. These are two situations in which the strategy, in combination with both mechanisms, results in a conflict (a non-efficient result). The reason for this inefficiency may be the failure to include conflict-resolution techniques. It is conjectured that enhancing the mechanisms with such techniques would result in a stable and efficient outcome in those two situations as well
  • Keywords
    cooperative systems; uncertainty handling; DAI; conflict-resolution techniques; distributed AI; incomplete information; negotiation mechanisms; worth; Artificial intelligence; Computer science; Costs; Protocols;
  • fLanguage
    English
  • Publisher
    ieee
  • Conference_Titel
    Intelligent and Cooperative Information Systems, 1993., Proceedings of International Conference on
  • Conference_Location
    Rotterdam
  • Print_ISBN
    0-8186-3135-X
  • Type

    conf

  • DOI
    10.1109/ICICIS.1993.291749
  • Filename
    291749