Some economics of market-based distributed scheduling

Author

Walsh, William E. ; Wellman, Michael P. ; Wurman, Peter R. ; MacKie-Mason, Jeffrey K.

Author_Institution

Michigan Univ., Ann Arbor, MI, USA

fYear

1998

fDate

26-29 May 1998

Firstpage

612

Lastpage

621

Abstract

Market mechanisms solve distributed scheduling problems by allocating the scheduled resources according to market prices. We model distributed scheduling as a discrete resource allocation problem, and demonstrate the applicability of economic analysis to this framework. Drawing on results from the literature, we discuss the existence of equilibrium prices for some general classes of scheduling problems, and the quality of equilibrium solutions. We then present two auction protocols for implementing solutions, and analyze their computational and economic properties

Keywords

distributed processing; economic cybernetics; optimisation; resource allocation; scheduling; auction protocols; computational properties; discrete resource allocation problem; economics; equilibrium prices; market mechanisms; market prices; market-based distributed scheduling; Access protocols; Communication system control; Design methodology; Distributed computing; IP networks; Information analysis; Processor scheduling; Resource management;

fLanguage

English

Publisher

ieee

Conference_Titel

Distributed Computing Systems, 1998. Proceedings. 18th International Conference on

Conference_Location

Amsterdam

ISSN

1063-6927

Print_ISBN

0-8186-8292-2

Type

conf

DOI

10.1109/ICDCS.1998.679848

Filename

679848