• DocumentCode
    1908793
  • Title

    Supply Chain Contract Designing with Moral Hazard Based on Screening Model

  • Author

    Ma, Weimin ; Li, Chao

  • Author_Institution
    Sch. of Econ. & Manage., Tongji Univ., Shanghai, China
  • Volume
    3
  • fYear
    2009
  • fDate
    10-11 Oct. 2009
  • Firstpage
    997
  • Lastpage
    1000
  • Abstract
    Supply chain moral hazard caused by risk aversion is analyzed in the paper. Based on the screening model and some results derived in previous literatures, an incentive menu of contracts is reconstructed. One of the two main parameters that construct the menu has been redesigned and the properties of the new parameter, namely, the unit payoff coefficient are analyzed in detail.
  • Keywords
    contracts; design; risk management; social sciences; supply chains; moral hazard; risk aversion; screening model; supply chain contract design; unit payoff coefficient; Chaos; Conference management; Contracts; Design automation; Ethics; Hazards; Paper technology; Risk management; Supply chain management; Supply chains; incentive contract; moral hazard; screening model; supply chain;
  • fLanguage
    English
  • Publisher
    ieee
  • Conference_Titel
    Intelligent Computation Technology and Automation, 2009. ICICTA '09. Second International Conference on
  • Conference_Location
    Changsha, Hunan
  • Print_ISBN
    978-0-7695-3804-4
  • Type

    conf

  • DOI
    10.1109/ICICTA.2009.706
  • Filename
    5288166
    • Link To Document
    https://search.isc.ac/dl/search/defaultta.aspx?DTC=49&DC=1908793