• DocumentCode
    1975743
  • Title

    Relay power allocation in auction-based game approach

  • Author

    Dan Wu ; Yueming Cai ; Liang Zhou ; Rodrigues, Jose

  • Author_Institution
    Inst. of Commun. Eng., PLA Univ. of Sci. & Technol., Nanjing, China
  • fYear
    2012
  • fDate
    3-7 Dec. 2012
  • Firstpage
    1812
  • Lastpage
    1817
  • Abstract
    In this work, with respect to the uncertainty about the individual information, we investigate the relay power allocation problem from the energy-efficient, Pareto optimal, and competitive fairness perspective. At first, we design an easy-implementation energy efficiency metric, which aims at striking a balance between the QoS provisioning and the energy consumption. Then, an auction mechanism is proposed for relay power allocation. By transferring the auction mechanism into a game, we prove the existence, uniqueness, and Pareto optimality of the Nash equilibrium (NE) for our auction game, and show that the allocation strategies from the NE can achieve the energy efficiency in terms of the proposed metric. Next, we develop a distributed relay power allocation algorithm based on our best-response functions to reach the Pareto optimal NE. Importantly, we not only certify the convergence of the proposed algorithm, but also provide quantitative analysis on it. Extensive simulations results are conducted to confirm the validity of the analytical results.
  • Keywords
    Pareto optimisation; game theory; relay networks (telecommunication); Nash equilibrium; Pareto optimal NE; QoS; auction-based game approach; best-response functions; competitive fairness perspective; distributed relay power allocation algorithm; easy-implementation energy efficiency metric; energy consumption; individual information; Wireless cooperative networks; auction theory; energy efficiency; outage probability; power allocation;
  • fLanguage
    English
  • Publisher
    ieee
  • Conference_Titel
    Global Communications Conference (GLOBECOM), 2012 IEEE
  • Conference_Location
    Anaheim, CA
  • ISSN
    1930-529X
  • Print_ISBN
    978-1-4673-0920-2
  • Electronic_ISBN
    1930-529X
  • Type

    conf

  • DOI
    10.1109/GLOCOM.2012.6503378
  • Filename
    6503378