Numerical methods for Stackelberg-Nash equilibrium calculation with favorable and unfavorable followers

Author

Moya, S. ; Poznyak, A.

Author_Institution

Dept. of Autom. Control, CINVESTAV-IPN, Mexico City

fYear

2008

fDate

12-14 Nov. 2008

Firstpage

125

Lastpage

130

Abstract

Regularized versions of the rdquoProjectional Gradient Techniquerdquo and the ldquoExtraproximal Methodrdquo are suggested to be applied for finding Stackelberg-Nash equilibrium in a multi-participant static game. A comparative between these methods is shown. There exist two levels of hierarchy in decision making: the first one consists of a leader decision and the second one is formed by the decisions of (N - 1)-followers. The followers react to the leaderpsilas announced strategy by playing according to the Nash equilibrium concept among themselves selecting those of equilibriums which is most favorable or unfavorable for the leader. The convergence of the suggested procedure is analyzed. Simulation results illustrate the feasibility of this method.

Keywords

decision making; game theory; numerical analysis; Stackelberg-Nash equilibrium; multi-participant static game; numerical methods; Automatic control; Convergence; Decision making; Game theory; Lagrangian functions; Nash equilibrium; Optimization methods;

fLanguage

English

Publisher

ieee

Conference_Titel

Electrical Engineering, Computing Science and Automatic Control, 2008. CCE 2008. 5th International Conference on

Conference_Location

Mexico City

Print_ISBN

978-1-4244-2498-6

Electronic_ISBN

978-1-4244-2499-3

Type

conf

DOI

10.1109/ICEEE.2008.4723369

Filename

4723369