• DocumentCode
    2083225
  • Title

    Evolutionary game of altruistic and selfish behaviors

  • Author

    Xiang, Qi ; Yong, Zhao

  • Author_Institution
    Inst. of Syst. Eng., Huazhong Univ. of Sci.&Tech., Wuhan, China
  • Volume
    1
  • fYear
    2008
  • fDate
    17-19 Nov. 2008
  • Firstpage
    508
  • Lastpage
    512
  • Abstract
    The game model of Prisoner¿s Dilemma is applied to describe the survival game between altruistic behaviors and selfish behaviors. The game model is extended to an evolutionary game. The survival conditions for altruistic behaviors are obtained. Simulation results show that altruists tend to cluster so as to improve their survival probability. The conclusions are useful to the stability study of social structure and design of social mechanism.
  • Keywords
    evolutionary computation; game theory; probability; altruistic behavior; evolutionary game theory; prisoner dilemma; selfish behavior; survival game; survival probability; Animals; Costs; Electronic mail; Evolution (biology); Game theory; Humans; Intelligent systems; Knowledge engineering; Mathematical model; Systems engineering and theory;
  • fLanguage
    English
  • Publisher
    ieee
  • Conference_Titel
    Intelligent System and Knowledge Engineering, 2008. ISKE 2008. 3rd International Conference on
  • Conference_Location
    Xiamen
  • Print_ISBN
    978-1-4244-2196-1
  • Electronic_ISBN
    978-1-4244-2197-8
  • Type

    conf

  • DOI
    10.1109/ISKE.2008.4730984
  • Filename
    4730984
    • Link To Document
    https://search.isc.ac/dl/search/defaultta.aspx?DTC=49&DC=2083225