DocumentCode
2096179
Title
Permit Allocation Options: Auctioning or Grandfathering
Author
Yang, Ruigui ; Wang, Pingping
Author_Institution
Sch. of Art, Jiangxi Univ. of Finance & Econ., Nanchang, China
fYear
2010
fDate
28-31 March 2010
Firstpage
1
Lastpage
4
Abstract
In discussions about the policy design of domestic emission trading, e.g., when implementing the Kyoto Protocol, the two permit allocation alternatives-auctioning and allocation gratis (grandfathering) - are often pitted against each other as representing Utopian cost-effectiveness and political realism, respectively. In this note, an attempt is made to extract the main points of a comparison between the two options with respect to efficiency and distribution.
Keywords
power markets; allocation gratis; auctioning; domestic emission trading; grandfathering; permit allocation options; Art; Cost function; Environmental economics; Finance; Global warming; Information technology; Pollution; Protocols; Regulators; Resource management;
fLanguage
English
Publisher
ieee
Conference_Titel
Power and Energy Engineering Conference (APPEEC), 2010 Asia-Pacific
Conference_Location
Chengdu
Print_ISBN
978-1-4244-4812-8
Electronic_ISBN
978-1-4244-4813-5
Type
conf
DOI
10.1109/APPEEC.2010.5448536
Filename
5448536
Link To Document