DocumentCode
2118315
Title
Credit Soft Budget Constraint and the Goal Difference
Author
Lei Han-yun ; Wang, Shihua
Author_Institution
Finance Sch., Xinjiang Univ. of Finance & Econ., Urumqi, China
fYear
2010
fDate
24-26 Dec. 2010
Firstpage
19
Lastpage
23
Abstract
From the relevant interest game, this article establishes a tripartite game model involving enterprise, bank and government to analyze their behavior and their goal difference of how to influence the enterprise credit default. The model shows that for political and economic interests, the government implements the soft budget constraint to enterprise repayment through subsidies to bank and enterprise.
Keywords
budgeting; credit transactions; game theory; credit soft budget constraint; enterprise credit default; enterprise repayment; goal difference; tripartite game model; Information science; credit default; game theory; soft budget constraint;
fLanguage
English
Publisher
ieee
Conference_Titel
Information Science and Engineering (ISISE), 2010 International Symposium on
Conference_Location
Shanghai
ISSN
2160-1283
Print_ISBN
978-1-61284-428-2
Type
conf
DOI
10.1109/ISISE.2010.114
Filename
5945042
Link To Document