DocumentCode
2145572
Title
Environmental Violations Monitoring and Analysis Based on Game Theory
Author
Yong Zhu ; Zheng Li
Author_Institution
Sch. of Econ. & Manage., Chongqing Normal Univ., Chongqing, China
fYear
2013
fDate
27-29 Sept. 2013
Firstpage
594
Lastpage
596
Abstract
The difficulty of the environmental management system is that the monitoring and supervision of the environmental violations, the paper constructs a model of Prisoner´s Dilemma Game between regulators and sewage companies. Studies have shown that the regulatory frequency with the increase of penalties can effectively reduce illegal polluting behavior, thus helping to improve the level of government environmental governance.
Keywords
environmental monitoring (geophysics); game theory; pollution control; environmental management system; environmental regulatory agencies; environmental violation analysis; environmental violation monitoring; environmental violation supervision; game theory; government environmental governance level improvement; illegal polluting behavior reduction; penalties; prisoner´s dilemma game model; regulatory frequency; sewage companies; Economics; Games; Government; Inspection; Monitoring; Pollution; Regulators; Analysis; Environmental Violations; Monitoring;
fLanguage
English
Publisher
ieee
Conference_Titel
Computational Intelligence and Communication Networks (CICN), 2013 5th International Conference on
Conference_Location
Mathura
Type
conf
DOI
10.1109/CICN.2013.129
Filename
6658065
Link To Document